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It is sometimes assumed in the Bayesian coherentist literature that 
the project of finding a truth-conducive measure of coherence of 
testimonial contents will, if successful, be helpful to the coherentist 
theory of justification. Various impossibility results in the Bayesian 
coherentist literature are consequently taken to be prima facie 
detrimental to the coherentist theory of justification. These 
attempts to connect Bayesian coherentism to the coherentist/
foundationalist debate in classical epistemology rest upon a 
confusion between the justification of a proposition and the 
credibility that a proposition has for some other proposition. 
Foundationalism requires a class of beliefs that have non-
inferential justification, not beliefs that have credibility by 
themselves for others. Coherentists insist that beliefs can be 
justified only via inferential relations with others, but this does not 
mean that coherentists must deny that individual propositions can 
have credibility for other propositions. I analyze and respond to 
both Erik Olsson's and Michael Huemer's arguments concerning 
the alleged connection between the Bayesian coherentist project 
and the coherentist theory of justification. Finally, I argue that 
Bayesian coherentism as represented in the literature, so far from 
being a version of coherentism, is implicitly foundationalist 
because of its treatment of “witness reports”, especially the reports 
of memory and sensation, as given evidence. The impossibility 
results, based on the assumption of given reports, are therefore not 
targeted at classical coherentism in epistemology at all. !












Influential scholars writing in the area of formal epistemology known as 
Bayesian coherentism have argued that the success or failure of the 
Bayesian coherentist project is connected tightly to the classical 
epistemological debate between foundationalists and coherentists 
concerning the structure of justification. Given such a tight connection, if 
an intuitively plausible measure of coherence for the contents of 
“testimonies” (including the “testimonies” of apparent memory and 
sensation) can be found which is truth conducive, this will bolster the 
coherentist position in epistemology. Conversely, if there is such a 
connection between Bayesian coherentism and the coherentist position in 
epistemology, and if it can be proven that no such truth-conducive 
measure of coherence exists, such a result will be negatively relevant to 
the coherentist epistemological position.  1
The impression that there is a connection between Bayesian coherentism 
and the coherentist position in classical (non-formal) epistemology is 
incorrect. There is nothing distinctively coherentist as opposed to 
foundationalist about the idea that congruence among testimonies is 
truth-conducive. There is nothing anti-foundationalist about justifying 
realism or the general reliability of our senses and of memory by means 
of a cumulative case among items of our empirical evidence. Even strong 
foundationalists who insist on incorrigible foundations can accept such a 
project. Whether Bayesians accept the various putative impossibility 
results for the existence of a truth-conducive measure of coherence (see 
below) or continue to try to find responses to them (Huemer 2007, 
Schupbach 2008, Bovens and Hartman 2003, pp. 25-26), they should not 
think that the discovery and defense of a truth-conducive measure of the 
coherence of testimony or the coherence of the “reports” of our senses or 
apparent memories would make foundations, even incorrigible 
foundations, unnecessary for empirical knowledge or would strengthen 
the case for a coherence theory of justification.  
In section 2 I will briefly lay out some aspects of the Bayesian coherentist 
project and the relevance of several probability theoretic results to this 
project. Because nearly every aspect of the Bayesian coherentist project 
is a matter of contention among Bayesian coherence theorists, and 
because the literature is very large, this overview will of necessity 
simplify some matters and leave others out.  !
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 In addition to Erik Olsson (2005, 2013) and Michael Huemer (2007, 2011), on whom 1
this paper focuses, Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann (2003, pp. 3, 26) and Gregory 
Wheeler (2009) have stated that the success of the Bayesian coherentist project is related 
to the success of the coherentist theory of justification.
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In section 3 I will discuss a crucial distinction between the probability (or 
justification) of a proposition, on the one hand, and the confirmational 
force of a proposition, on the other. (In some of the Bayesian coherence 
literature, the latter is called the “individual credibility” of a proposition.) 
I will also explain how these two concepts function and do not function 
in the classical debate between foundationalists and coherentists. 
In section 4 I will explain two confusions in some of the Bayesian 
coherentist literature. First, there is a confusion in the interpretation of C. 
I. Lewis between his treatment of what I will call the “report 
propositions” and the “content propositions”. Second, there is a confusion 
between the individual justification of a proposition and the individual 
confirmational force of a proposition. These confusions have affected 
both the interpretation of the seminal work of C. I. Lewis on coherence 
and the understanding of the epistemological significance of the Bayesian 
coherence project itself. 
In section 5 I will argue that the attempted impossibility proofs and the 
Bayesian coherentist project as presented in the literature are implicitly 
foundationalist. !
2. Bayesian coherentism and impossibility results !
In very broad terms, the Bayesian coherentist project is the attempt to 
show that the coherence of the contents of a set of reports (in a broad 
sense of “reports”) bears a positive relationship to the truth of what the 
reports attest. Theorists working in the area of Bayesian coherentism, 
broadly conceived, are usually investigating whether there is such a 
relationship, though many working in the field have come to a negative 
conclusion on that question. (I will use the phrase “Bayesian coherence 
theorist” to cover both those who come to a negative and those who come 
to a positive conclusion on this question.) The “reports” can be real 
human witness testimony or the “testimony” of our senses or apparent 
memories. Some Bayesian coherence theorists (e.g., Schupbach 2008) 
still hope to find a measure of coherence which is in general truth-
conducive, though Michael Huemer (2007, pp. 342-3) has argued that 
Bayesian coherentists need to argue only that coherence is truth-
conducive in some more restricted set of interesting cases, not in general. 
Following C. I. Lewis's largely unformalized suggestions (1946, pp. 239, 
338, 346-7), Bayesian coherence theory investigates the hope of using 
coherence as part of the project to answer Cartesian skepticism and to 
justify our beliefs in the existence of the external world and in the 
reliability of memory and the senses. (See Olsson 2005, pp. 12, 34ff, 
74-6, Bovens and Hartmann 2003, pp. 26-7, Huemer 2007, pp. 342-4.) !
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Coherence as a purely formal concept can be thought of (very broadly) as 
mutual positive relevance among the members of a set of propositions. 
Many formal measures of coherence have been proposed, including the 
measure suggested by Tomoji Shogenji (1999), one suggested by both 
Erik Olsson (2002) and by David Glass (2002), a measure suggested by 
Luc Bovens and Stephan Hartmann (2003, pp. 30-34), and Brandon 
Fitelson's proposed measure (2003). Shogenji's suggested measure of 
coherence, for example, is the ratio of the conjunction of a set of 
propositions to their independent individual probabilities: 
P(A1 & … & An) 
————————— 
P(A1) × … × P(An) 
Different suggested probabilistic measures of coherence are accompanied 
by different sets of suggested ceteris paribus conditions. The ceteris 
paribus conditions are important to the larger Bayesian coherentist 
project that motivates theorists to try to formalize a measure of coherence 
and show it to be truth conducive. If we are to compare the coherence of 
two sets of believed or asserted propositions (the contents of “reports”) in 
order to discover whether coherence thus defined is truth conducive or 
not, we should hold a relevant set of other factors equal in making the 
comparison. What else should be held equal is a source of much 
controversy among Bayesian coherence theorists. Different theorists also 
offer different accounts of what type of independence we should assume 
between or among the “reports” (usually some variety of conditional 
independence) in order to capture epistemic intuitions about when 
agreement among “reports” is significantly truth-conducive. 
Erik Olsson (2005, pp. 134ff) and Bovens and Hartmann (2003, pp. 19ff) 
have proven slightly different results showing that, given the ceteris 
paribus conditions and independence conditions they respectively favor, 
the coherence of the contents of a set of reports is not in general truth-
conducive for the conjunction of those contents. Shogenji (2013, pp. 
529-34) has further proven that, given a set of ceteris paribus and 
independence conditions he favors, the coherence of the contents of a set 
of reports is not in general truth-conducive for a salient hypothesis H 
which is not equivalent to the conjunction of the contents of the reports. 
It has also been proven that, if two reports W1 and W2 are conditionally 
independent of one another modulo both some hypothesis A and its 
negation, that is, if both: 
P(W1|A & W2) = P(W1|A) 
and 
P(W1|~A & W2) = P(W1|~A), !
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and if neither W1 nor W2 alone has any positive relevance to A, then the 
conjunction of W1 and W2 also has no positive relevance for A. (See 
Huemer 1997 and Olsson 2005, pp. 112-16.) If it is taken to be a 
requirement of the coherence theory of justification that testimonial 
reports can have no positive relevance individually for their contents (as 
Michael Huemer takes it to be), but that testimonial evidence does justify 
its content by coherence among several reports taken conjunctively, this 
result appears prima facie to be a blow to the coherence theory of 
justification. Huemer (2007, pp. 340-2) has argued subsequently that the 
coherentist should not adopt full conditional independence as the most 
advantageous model for his position. 
My argument in what follows calls into question the claim that the project 
of Bayesian coherentism, to the extent that it is successful in finding a 
truth-conducive measure of coherence, supports the coherence theory of 
justification against the foundationalist theory. In particular, the issue of 
the individual confirmational force of propositions for other propositions 
swings free of the foundationalist vs. coherentist debate. The various 
impossibility results, and the attempts to answer them, remain interesting 
for their own sake. It remains also a fascinating question what role, if any, 
the mutual positive relevance either of "reports" or of the contents of 
“reports” plays in the justification of our most important empirical beliefs 
about the external world and the reliability of our senses and memory. 
However, it will help to clarify our thinking if we set aside the idea that 
the coherentist theory of justification is either supported or refuted by 
conclusions drawn from these investigations.  2
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 Tomoji Shogenji (2005, pp. 311-12) has made brief comments which concur with the 2
thesis of this paper--that the aims of Bayesian coherentism are not coherentist in the 
classical epistemological sense and that the report propositions are taken as given by 
Bayesian coherentists, which fits well into a foundationalist schema. However, Shogenji's 
brief remarks were made prior to the publication of the explicit and detailed arguments to 
the contrary that I am discussing, and he does not argue the points.
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3. Justification, positive relevance, and foundationalism !
To understand how the idea has arisen that Bayesian coherentism is 
related to the coherence theory of justification, it is necessary to 
distinguish confirmational force or positive relevance, on the one hand, 
from justification, on the other hand. As I am using the terms, the 
“confirmational force” or “positive relevance” of an evidential 
proposition E is its ability to provide confirmation to some other 
proposition H. So to say that E has confirmational force or positive 
relevance in this sense is always to make a relational claim. E has 
confirmational force for H if and only if P(H|E) > P(H).  3
On the other hand, either E or H is justified just in case it has, for the 
subject, sufficiently high probability, either foundationally (if 
foundationalism is true) or by inference from other propositions.  4
The foundationalist position in epistemology is entirely related to the 
justification of beliefs (or propositions as believed by subjects) and to the 
structure of that justification. According to foundationalism, all 
justification is ultimately, when properly understood and analyzed, one-
directional (see Foley 1980 and McGrew and McGrew 2008). Inferred 
beliefs must be based upon a privileged set of beliefs whose justification 
does not, in turn, depend upon inference. Laurence BonJour describes the 
position clearly. 
The most fundamental [epistemic issue] is a general problem 
having to do with the overall justificatory structure of the system of 
empirical knowledge.... [T]he common denominator among 
[versions of foundationalism], the central thesis of epistemological 
foundationalism as understood here, is the two-fold thesis: (a) that 
some empirical beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification 
which is somehow immediate or intrinsic to them, at least in the 
sense of not being dependent, inferentially or otherwise, on the  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 The question of the role of background evidence here is an interesting one. Should we 3
say that E has individual positive force for H if some particular background evidence is 
required to make it relevant? It seems that the coherence theorists I want to discuss would 
say that individual confirmational force (or “individual credibility”, as they call it) should 
be construed without including any background beliefs. However, I cannot find any place 
where they address this question explicitly. It might make a difference if we are talking 
about literal testimony of witnesses as opposed to the “testimony” of sensory or memory 
experiences in a Cartesian context. Background knowledge is obviously relevant in the 
case of literal witnesses and normal background, and there is a fairly clear meaning to the 
concept of individual force of the testimonies of literal witnesses.
 As is generally the case in formal epistemology, in this paper I do not insist on a 4
particular theory of the nature of probability. Readers are free to take “probability” to 
refer to subjective personal degrees of belief, though I am more inclined to construe 
probability in terms of logical relations of propositions as these would be understood by a 
hypothetical perfectly rational subject.
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epistemic justification of other beliefs; and (b) that it is these 
“basic beliefs”, as they are sometimes called, which are the 
ultimate source of justification for all of empirical knowledge. All 
other empirical beliefs, on this view, derive whatever justification 
they possess from standing in appropriate inferential or evidential 
relations to the members of this epistemically privileged class. 
(BonJour 1985, pp. 16-17, emphasis in original.) 
Moderate foundationalists hold that these foundational beliefs may have 
merely intermediate probability, but not in virtue of inference from 
anything else. The positive probability of the moderate foundationalist's 
privileged propositions must, of course, be high enough to rate some 
positive epistemic status, which the moderate foundationalist may call by 
various names such as “justification” or “warrant” (see BonJour 1985, p. 
26). The strong foundationalist insists, instead, that the foundations on 
which our everyday beliefs are based must have maximal probability. 
They must be certain or incorrigible. (McGrew, T. 1995, pp. 57-58, 
BonJour 1985, p. 26-27). 
Nothing in even the strong foundationalist position implies that inferred 
beliefs must be justified or even partially confirmed by means of single, 
individual foundational beliefs as opposed to conjunctions of 
foundational beliefs. McGrew, for example, in defending strong 
foundationalism (which he calls "classical foundationalism") pictures an 
“evidence tree” in which some inferred belief Q1 might require an entire 
set of foundational propositions {R1...Rn}for its justification. (McGrew, 
T. 1995, p. 50) 
This means that foundationalism, even in its strongest form, does not 
require that individual foundational beliefs, taken alone, must have 
confirmational force for inferred beliefs. It would be possible to demand 
incorrigible foundations while holding that in some given case or even in 
a great many cases it is only the conjunction of a set of foundational 
beliefs that confirms some important inferred belief. The structure of 
justification, in that case, would remain one-directional, and the 
incorrigibility of the foundations would still be necessary. The evidence 
tree picture, with the foundations as the “roots”, is consistent with a 
situation in which each individual member of {R1...Rn} does have some 
degree of credibility for a higher-level belief Q1, but it is also consistent 
with a situation in which this is not the case. The foundationalist will 
always insist that individual foundational beliefs must have justification 
(for the incorrigibilist, a maximal probability of 1), but he need not insist 
that individual foundational beliefs have evidential force by themselves 
for other propositions. 
It is also possible for the confirmational force which ultimately comes 
from the conjunction of foundational evidence to be manifested in 
complex ways at higher levels of the evidence structure (see McGrew and  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McGrew 2008 and McGrew, L. 2010). Richard Foley (1980, pp. 60-61) 
points out correctly that the foundationalist position, strictly speaking, is 
that non-foundational propositions are not sources of justification at all 
but rather channels of the justificatory force that ultimately comes from 
the foundations. However, this does not preclude foundationalism from 
acknowledging and accounting for relations that are intuitively thought of 
as “mutual support”. The role of non-foundational propositions as 
channels of various foundational propositions is crucial to the analysis of 
mutual support (McGrew and McGrew 2008). If the project of Bayesian 
coherentism or a closely related project is successful, the foundationalist 
will argue that it is successful in virtue of the fact that the justification 
ultimately provided by the foundations can in some cases be described in 
terms of a measure of positive relevance among items of evidence or 
among the contents of a set of sensory or testimonial “reports.” The 
specifics of any foundationalist explication of a truth-conducive 
coherence measure (if one is ultimately found) will depend upon the 
specifics of the measure in question, upon ceteris paribus conditions, 
and, perhaps even more crucially, upon independence conditions among 
items of evidence (see previous section).  There is no reason to think that 5
such a foundationalist explication is impossible in principle. 
Coherentists, in contrast to both moderate and strong foundationalists, 
reject the requirement for one-directional justification and hold that our 
empirical beliefs are justified entirely in terms of inferential support 
relations (coherence relations) within a web of beliefs which confer 
justification upon the set or system. Coherentists reject the existence of 
any foundationally justified beliefs--that is, beliefs that a subject is 
justified in holding without inferring them from anything else. As 
BonJour explains, 
If there is no way to justify empirical beliefs apart from an appeal 
to other justified empirical beliefs, and if an infinite sequence of 
distinct justified beliefs is ruled out, then the presumably finite 
system of justified empirical beliefs can only be justified from 
within, by virtue of the relations of its component beliefs to each 
other--if, that is, it is justified at all. (BonJour 1985, pp. 87-88) 
But this essential coherentist position does not imply that it is impossible 
for an individual proposition, by itself, to have confirmational force for 
some other proposition. For example, suppose that the subject believes, 
“The balls in this bag are all painted only with even numbers.” There is 
nothing about the coherentist position that requires that this proposition  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 My own suggestion, the exposition of which lies beyond the scope of this paper, is that it 5
would be more helpful to think about the coherence of the reports themselves rather than 
the coherence of their contents, and that we should try to explain this coherence in a way 
that is relative to some hypothesis of interest. C.I. Lewis, the arch-foundationalist, was 
particularly insistent that the reports be independent given the negation of an hypothesis 
of interest (1946, pp. 344, 349).
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has no positive relevance by itself for the proposition, “The ball I will 
pull out of this bag will not be painted with the number three.” In fact, the 
second proposition has a probability of 1 given the first proposition. A 
picture in which an individual proposition has the power to raise the 
probability of another is not at all contrary to the principles of coherentist 
justification. Yet, as I shall point out below, Michael Huemer argues 
strenuously that the coherentist must assert that propositions do not have 
individual confirmational force, and Erik Olsson labels the denial of 
individual positive relevance an assertion of “non-foundationalism.” !
4. Individual confirmational force and foundational justification in 
the literature !
A confusion on these issues in the Bayesian coherence literature appears 
to stem in part from an incorrect interpretation of some now-famous 
comments by C. I. Lewis: 
The principle in question may be illustrated by the example of a 
number of witnesses, each of them not especially trustworthy as 
individual reporters, who independently tell the same 
circumstantial story. In case of such concurrence, one must quickly 
be convinced that what they tell is practically certain. In similar 
fashion, the probability of an objective belief...may come to have 
very high probability, even on the basis of confirmations which, 
taken separately, might not warrant a particularly high degree of 
assurance. (Lewis 1946, p. 239) 
Our previous example of the relatively unreliable witnesses who 
independently tell the same circumstantial story, is another 
illustration of the logic of congruence;...For any one of these 
reports, taken singly, the extent to which it confirms what is 
reported may be slight. And antecedently, the probability of what is 
reported may also be small. But congruence of the reports 
establishes a high probability of what they agree upon, by 
principles of probability determination which are familiar:....
(Lewis 1946, p. 346) 
Lewis defines the coherence in which he is interested (which he calls 
“congruence”) as follows: 
A set of statements, or a set of supposed facts asserted, will be said 
to be congruent if and only if they are so related that the antecedent 
probability of any one of them will be increased if the remainder of 
the set can be assumed as given premises. (1946, p. 338) !
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The context in which Lewis applies the scenario of the “unreliable 
witnesses” is the justification of memorial beliefs. Lewis acknowledges 
that our apparent memories do not guarantee what we seem to remember 
and that our apparent memories taken individually do not seem to give 
very high probability to that which they attest (1946, p. 334). He brings in 
the scenario of the individually unreliable witnesses who tell the same 
story as an analogy for memorial beliefs which, taken jointly, provide a 
stronger case for that which they attest than they would taken singly, 
because of the phenomenon of congruence among them. 
Erik Olsson (2013) incorrectly takes Lewis's position concerning memory 
to be a version of weak foundationalism. When discussing the coherence 
theory of justification and different versions of foundationalism, Olsson 
implies that the phrase “supposed facts asserted” as used by Lewis refers 
to moderately justified foundational beliefs that are assigned a “special 
role” because they are “close to experience.” 
There is an obvious objection that any coherence theory of 
justification or knowledge must immediately face. It is called 
the isolation objection: how can the mere fact that a system is 
coherent, if the latter is understood as a purely system-internal 
matter, provide any guidance whatsoever to truth and reality? Since 
the theory does not assign any essential role to experience, there is 
little reason to think that a coherent system of belief will accurately 
reflect the external world. A variation on this theme is presented by 
the equally notorious alternative systems objection. For each 
coherent system of beliefs there exist, conceivably, other systems 
that are equally coherent yet incompatible with the first system. If 
coherence is sufficient for justification, then all these incompatible 
systems will be justified. But this observation, of course, 
thoroughly undermines any claim suggesting that coherence is 
indicative of truth. 
As we shall see, most, if not all, influential coherence theorists try 
to avoid these traditional objections by assigning some beliefs that 
are close to experience a special role, whether they are called 
“supposed facts asserted” (Lewis, 1946), “truth-candidates”..., 
“cognitively spontaneous beliefs” (BonJour, 1985) or something 
else. Depending on how this special role is construed, these 
theories may be more fruitfully classified as versions of weak 
foundationalism than as pure coherence theories. An advocate of 
weak foundationalism typically holds that while coherence is 
incapable of justifying beliefs from scratch, it can provide 
justification for beliefs that already have some initial, perhaps 
miniscule, degree of warrant, e.g., for observational beliefs. !
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The reference to these beliefs “close to experience” as having an initial 
degree of warrant indicates that Olsson is taking them to be moderate 
foundations--they have this degree of warrant not in virtue of being 
inferred from other, foundational beliefs but rather in virtue of something 
else, such as their being cognitively spontaneous or “observational” in 
nature. (Cf. Olsson 2005, p. 65, which refers to a “Lewisian weak 
foundationalism.”) In this passage, Olsson recognizes correctly that 
foundationalism is concerned with the warrant or justification of a set of 
privileged beliefs to which foundationalists assign a special role. 
However, he is incorrect to take Lewis to hold a version of moderate 
foundationalism that grants some privileged but non-certain beliefs an 
“initial” degree of warrant. 
To explain Lewis's use of the phrase “supposed facts asserted”, it will be 
useful to lay out a notation that enables us to distinguish clearly what I 
will call the report propositions from the content propositions. I will 
continue to use the convention of witness reports, with the continued 
understanding that, per Lewis, this analysis is meant to extend to reports 
that come from non-personal sources such as apparent memory or 
sensation. Let us stipulate that report propositions will be designated by 
W1, W2, and so forth. A report proposition is the statement that a witness 
has testified to a particular content. When, for simplicity's sake, I am 
assuming that the witnesses are saying exactly the same thing, I will 
simply designate the content as A, without use of a subscript. With all this 
in place, if two witnesses both attest that A, the report propositions are as 
follows: 
W1 Witness 1 says that A. 
W2 Witness 2 says that A. 
If the witnesses attest different things, the report propositions can be 
shown like this: 
W1 Witness 1 says that A1. 
W2 Witness 2 says that A2. 
So, for example, if two witnesses say that Jackson was at the crime scene, 
we have the report propositions 
W1 Witness 1 says that Jackson was at the crime scene, 
W2 Witness 2 says that Jackson was at the crime scene, 
and the content proposition 
A   Jackson was at the crime scene. !!
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Virtually all of the interest in Bayesian coherence literature about reports 
is directed toward the application of coherence measures to the A's, the 
contents of various witnesses' reports, in an attempt to see whether an 
increase in the unconditional positive relevance of the contents of various 
witness reports is truth-conducive for the conjunction of those contents.  6
C.I. Lewis's interest in discovering whether coherence among “supposed 
facts asserted” is of epistemic value is the historic origin of this focus in 
the literature on the content propositions. Lewis is, of course, well-known 
for his insistence on the necessity for a given element in experience 
(Lewis 1952, 1946 pp. 171ff, 186), and there is no reason whatsoever to 
think that he made an exception to this requirement in the area of 
memory. Rather, Lewis uses the phrase “supposed facts asserted” (Lewis 
1946, p. 338) to refer not to any foundational propositions but rather to 
the A's which are attested by the W's. In contrast, the “reports” are the 
W's, the incorrigible deliverances of the “witnesses”- i.e., our experiential 
beliefs. Lewis confirms this interpretation when he explicitly analogizes 
incorrigible experience to the report of a witness. 
The root of the matter is that the unreliable reporters do make such 
congruent reports without collusion; that we do find ourselves 
presented with recollections which hang together too well to be 
dismissed as illusions of memory. The indispensable item is some 
direct empirical datum; the actually given reports, the facts of our 
seeming to remember; and without that touchstone of presentation, 
relations of congruence would not advance us a step toward 
determination of the empirically actual or the validly credible. 
(Lewis 1946, pp. 352-3) 
Hence, a proposition like “I went to the store yesterday” would be a 
content proposition, while the “report” itself would be a memory-like 
experiential belief such as, “I seem to recall having gone to the store 
yesterday.” The content proposition has, in Lewis's system, only 
inferential justification, while the experiential report is certain and is non-
inferentially justified. Olsson's identification of Lewis as a “weak 
foundationalist” is based upon a confusion concerning the status in 
Lewis's system of the A's--the content propositions or the “supposed 
facts” which are “asserted” by the “reports” of memory and sensation. 
When Olsson (2013) discusses Lewis's insistence that memory-like 
experiences do need to have some degree of individual confirmational 
force, he ties this as well to his claim that Lewis is a weak 
foundationalist. Lewis says  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 Bovens and Hartmann (2003, pp. 15ff) have worked on coherence and the truth of an 6
entire set of A's where the A's are not all identical. Others (e.g., Olsson 2005, pp. 24ff) 
have simplified the model by discussing cases where witnesses testify the same thing--
that is, where the A's are identical. Only Wheeler (e.g., 2009) has published work focused 
on the coherence of the report propositions as opposed to the content propositions.
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[T]hese are, of course, generalizations from past experience (of 
remembering, and of later confirming or disconfirming) and as 
such are presently available only in the form of remembered 
experience, and require for their own authentication the 
presumption of initial credibility of the merely remembered as 
such. And the degree of this initial credibility, we have said, is 
hardly assignable. But it does not need to be assigned....If, 
however, there were no initial presumption attaching to the 
mnemically presented...then no extent of congruity with other such 
items would give rise to any eventual credibility (Lewis 1946, p. 
357). 
Olsson (2013) concludes from this, 
While Lewis allows that individual reports need not be very 
credible considered in isolation for coherence to have a positive 
effect, he is firmly committed to the view that their credibility must 
not be nil. He writes, in his discussion of reports from memory, 
that “[i]f … there were no initial presumption attaching to the 
mnemically presented … then no extent of congruity with other 
such items would give rise to any eventual credibility” (357). In 
other words, if a belief system is completely isolated from the 
world, then no justification will ensue from observing the 
coherence of its elements. Thus, Lewis is advocating weak 
foundationalism rather than a pure coherence theory. 
Here we encounter another source of the confusion concerning the 
connection between Bayesian coherentism and theories of justification. 
When Olsson refers to the “credibility” of the individual reports, he is 
referring to what I have called confirmational force. So is Lewis. Lewis's 
“initial presumption attaching to the mnemically presented” clearly refers 
to some degree to which each of the W's individually confirms each of 
the A’s. 
The usage of “credibility” to mean positive probabilistic relevance is 
present, too, in Olsson's discussion of “non-foundationalism”, which he 
(following Huemer, as I will discuss below) understands as an assertion 
of the absence of individual probabilistic relevance. Olsson calls a 
position “nonfoundationalism” if, according to that position, the 
probability of some proposition of interest A is not changed (and in 
particular, is not raised) by either of two items of evidence taken 
individually. 
P(A|E1) = P(A) 
P(A|E2) = P(A) (Olsson 2013; Cf. Olsson 2005, p. 72.) 
Olsson therefore takes Lewis's assertion that individual apparent 
memories must have some degree of confirmational force for their 
contents to mean that Lewis is a weak foundationalist. He is a 
foundationalist, on Olsson's view, because Lewis states that the “reports”  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must have some degree of confirmational force. He is a weak 
foundationalist on Olsson's view, because their degree of confirmational 
force can be very small. Olsson also takes nonfoundationalism to be the 
denial of any individual degree of confirmational force. 
But the claim that memory-like beliefs both do and must have individual 
confirmational force, though a claim made by Lewis, is not a central 
thesis of foundationalism, whether strong or weak. Nor is it essential to 
Lewis's own incorrigibilist foundationalism.  In other words, Olsson 7
moves away from an actually essential position of foundationalism--that 
the foundational beliefs must have non-inferential justification--to the 
separate claim, which is not essential to foundationalism, that the 
foundational reports of sensation and memory must have individual 
confirmational force for some proposition A.  8
The same confusion is amply illustrated in Michael Huemer's discussions 
of this issue, in which he treats the matter of individual confirmational 
force as a watershed between foundationalists and coherentists. In a 
discussion of the question “Must the coherentist reject individual 
credibility?” Huemer argues for the surprising conclusion that the 
coherentist must do so. 
[T]his theorem [that independent propositions with no individual 
force also have no force taken together] poses a problem only for 
coherentists who claim that coherence can provide justification in 
the absence of any credibility on the part of individual witnesses or 
individual beliefs. Why should we saddle the coherentist with this 
claim? 
First, the claim is crucial to differentiating foundationalism from 
coherentism. Foundationalists and coherentists can agree that, if a 
proposition coheres with a set of beliefs that are themselves 
already justified, then that proposition is thereby to some degree 
justified....Foundationalists and coherentists, in short, do not differ 
over whether coherence can be epistemically valuable. Where they 
differ is over whether coherence alone can provide justification for 
belief, or whether we must posit a privileged class of belief having 
some individual credibility. (Huemer 2007, p. 339) 
Huemer's discussion begins here with the issue of individual credibility--
which, as Huemer defines it, is individual confirmational relevance. (See  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 The question of why Lewis insisted that the individual mnemonic beliefs must have 7
individual positive relevance for their contents is a fascinating one, but it lies outside the 
scope of this paper.
 Given Olsson's explicit use of BonJour in his discussion of Lewis in the immediate 8
context, it seems plausible that this mistake on Olsson's part has been borrowed from 
BonJour's discussion of Lewis (BonJour 1985, pp. 147-48). However, the BonJour 
passage on which Olsson relies is not entirely clear.
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Huemer 2007, p. 338 and 2011, pp. 38, 41 for formal definitions of 
individual credibility.) As he continues, Huemer states that the difference 
between foundationalism and coherentism concerns whether coherence 
can justify all our beliefs in the absence of some class of “privileged” 
propositions. That statement is correct as far as it goes. But the 
foundationalist's “privileged” propositions are not (necessarily) those that 
have individual confirmational force for some other proposition but 
rather those that have individual justification. In the final clause, Huemer 
incorrectly calls the foundationalist's privileged beliefs those which have 
“some individual credibility.” 
Huemer moves again to justification or “likeliness to be true” as his 
exposition goes on: 
It is said that putatively foundational beliefs, being supported by no 
reasons, must be merely arbitrary, or that the foundationalist cannot 
coherently explain why allegedly foundational beliefs should be 
thought likely to be true [my emphasis]. The coherence theory is 
advanced in large part as an alternative to such putatively arbitrary 
foundations. But a 'coherence' theory that allows beliefs to have a 
small degree of non-inferential justification [my emphasis] offers 
no escape from these sorts of problems. To avoid the central 
alleged defects of foundationalism, the coherentist must eschew 
foundational justification entirely. (Huemer 2007, pp. 339-40) 
These sentences describe a real, essential point at issue between 
coherentists and foundationalists--namely, the existence or non-existence 
of non-inferentially justified beliefs. However, in the very next sentence, 
Huemer switches back yet again, quite explicitly, to the issue of 
individual credibility (individual confirmational force) for some target 
proposition: 
The coherence theory of justification should therefore be 
understood as being committed to lack of individual credibility. In 
probabilistic terms, this means that we should assume in our 
testimonial models that P(A|W1) = P(A). (Huemer 2007, p. 340, 
my emphasis) 
Why “therefore”? As I have argued above, there is nothing whatsoever 
about the coherentist claim that there is no such thing as foundational 
justification that implies that there is no such thing as individual 
confirmational force from one proposition for another. The essential point 
of coherentism is not that propositions have ability to provide some 
support to other propositions only when taken in groups, but that 
empirical propositions or beliefs are themselves well-justified only when 
taken in groups, and that all justification is of this sort. 
It is only because of this confusion between foundational justification and 
individual positive relevance (which also arises in the 2011 article) that 
Huemer believes that his own earlier impossibility result (1997), showing  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that individually irrelevant and conditionally independent propositions 
can have no force when combined, is potentially problematic for the 
coherentist theory of justification. This concern in turn motivates him to 
make suggestions (2007 and 2011) to coherentists as to how they can 
evade this result while retaining what he views as their fundamental non-
foundational commitments. 
Thus we can see that attempts to connect Bayesian coherentism with 
coherentism as a theory of justification arise from confusions, either in 
interpretation (in Olsson's misunderstanding of C.I. Lewis) or in 
conceptual analysis (in the confusion between individual confirmational 
force and individual justification). !
5. Bayesian coherentism or Bayesian foundationalism? !
As I described it at the outset, the broad Bayesian coherentist project is 
the attempt to discover whether there is a positive relationship, either in 
general or in an important class of cases, between the coherence of the 
contents of a set of reports and the truth of what those reports attest. 
Whether such a relationship can be found or not, I have argued that it is 
compatible with a foundationalist structure and even with strong 
foundationalism. 
Even more interesting is the fact that the Bayesian coherentist literature 
related to reports, including the impossibility results, assumes that we 
have the reports and treats them as given evidence, independent of 
coherence considerations. The questions about testimony considered by 
Bayesian coherence theorists concern what the effect will be of 
conditionalizing on sets of report propositions (the W's) if what they 
report (the A's) is more (or less) coherent. The entire structure of the 
questions raised and debated is therefore implicitly one-directional and 
foundationalist, depending as it does on the existence of some given 
evidence and on inference from that given evidence to other, inferred 
propositions. 
The implicit foundationalism of Bayesian coherentism is also clear when 
we consider the intended connection to Cartesian skepticism and the 
problem of the external world. The hope of the Bayesian coherence 
project is that we might be able to use coherence relations among our 
sensory or memory-type experiences to help form a response to the 
Cartesian skeptic. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss whether 
or not this project is likely to succeed or whether the best way to 
understand it is in terms of coherence among the contents of sensory or 
memorial experience reports. Presumably the Cartesian skeptic would 
argue that his Deceiver can account for coherence relations as well as 
realism accounts for them.  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But the probable success of the proposed project is not to the point here. 
My point, rather, is that the very nature of the project involves treating 
the “reports”--i.e., the experiences--as the given evidence in virtue of 
which the higher-level beliefs are justified. These are exactly the sorts of 
things that foundationalists consider to be non-inferentially justified 
beliefs “having the character of ‘reports’" (Lewis 1946, p. 347). The 
strong foundationalist says that we are non-inferentially justified in 
believing that things seem to us to be a certain way and that we seem to 
remember such-and-such. It is then a question of whether and how we 
can justify more interesting propositions about real events and things in 
the external world based on these given foundations. The foundationalist 
insists that, at bottom, we must have something to work with, some 
evidence that is justified without inference, and that other beliefs are 
justified from those foundations. Bayesian coherentists seem tacitly to 
agree. 
Bayesian coherentism, then, isn't really a version of coherentism at all. 
There is nothing in the project of Bayesian coherentism that a 
foundationalist qua foundationalist must reject, and the treatment of the 
reports parallels the foundationalist demand for the given element in 
empirical justification. Conversely, the significance of the various 
impossibility results does not consist in their presenting a challenge to 
coherentism as a theory of justification.  Coherentism and 9
foundationalism will have to continue to battle it out on the basis of the 
kinds of arguments that have already been made in epistemology--e.g., 
arguments for and against the existence of loops of justification, the 
alleged value of coherence in the absence of foundational justification, 
and the necessity for a given element in experience. Perhaps Bayesian 
coherentism should get a new name.  10!!
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 Arguably, the argument here shows that the impossibility results are irrelevant to the 9
coherence theory of justification for an interesting additional reason. Given the structure 
of the impossibility results, the coherentist should probably reject them ab initio. The 
classical coherentist could object to the impossibility results by saying that they are 
implicitly question-begging against his position, since they take the justification of the 
report propositions to be unproblematic and conditionalize on those propositions one-
directionally. He could insist that he will consider no impossibility result to be relevant to 
his position unless it treats all of our justification, including our justification for believing 
that we have some set of reports, as arising from coherence and inferential relations 
among beliefs. But that position has never been defended anywhere that I am aware of in 
the Bayesian coherentist literature. It is the results themselves, not their presuppositions, 
that are considered prima facie problematic for coherentism.
 I am grateful to David Glass and Jonah Schupbach for helpful discussions during my 10
research for this article.
Lydia McGrew
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